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The Promise and Limits of 
Cooperative Federalism as  
a Constitutional Principle 
Warren J. Newman 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In this article, I shall address the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent 
jurisprudence on cooperative federalism and its promise for the future, 
from the perspective of federalism as an underlying constitutional 
principle. In its jurisprudence, particularly over the past decade, the 
Court moved from an ostensibly neutral view on what form federalism, 
as a normative concept, should take, to one of not just tolerating but 
actively encouraging flexible and cooperative federalism. There are 
limits to the ambit of cooperative federalism as an organizing principle, 
and it must be balanced with other principles, including parliamentary 
sovereignty and the separation of powers, and occasionally, with the fact 
that sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 18671 grant powers that 
are, in principle, exclusive and not concurrent (even though they may 
apply concurrently to certain matters through the double-aspect 
doctrine). On the separation of powers, there are also limits to what 
courts can do as adjudicative bodies in encouraging cooperation, and it 
falls principally to federal and provincial political actors to determine the 
dynamics and degree of cooperation, given the diversity of views and 
perspectives inherent in a federal system. Given its origins in the political 
dynamics of federal-provincial relations and its implementation largely 
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1 (1867), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 [formerly British North America Act]. 
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through political agreements and more or less informal institutional or 
administrative arrangements and concertation, cooperative federalism 
might be better understood and applied in the legal context as a modality 
of the federal principle, rather than as a full-blown constitutional 
principle in its own right. 
II. A FEDERAL UNION 
The first purpose of the British North America Act was to unite the 
provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and one might 
be forgiven if, upon a cursory reading of its opening provisions, one was 
to discern this as the first principle as well. The preamble to the Act 
spoke of the prospective “Union” as being conducive to the welfare of 
the provinces and as promoting the interests of the British Empire; that 
on the “Establishment of the Union” it would be expedient to provide for 
the constitution of legislative authority as well as to declare the nature of 
the executive government in the new Dominion — a monarchical form 
of government “under the Crown of the United Kingdom” — and to 
provide for the “eventual Admission into the Union” of other parts of 
British North America. Section 3 of the Act (“Declaration of Union”) 
authorized the Queen, on the advice of Her Majesty’s Privy Council, to 
declare by proclamation that the uniting provinces “shall form and be 
One Dominion under the Name of Canada”. Section 146 enabled the 
admission of other colonies or provinces “into the Union”, and at least 20 
other provisions in the Act referred to “the Union”.2  
However, what was contemplated was to be a federal union; the 
provinces were (in the words of the preamble) to be “federally united”; 
the Canadian union would (in the words of the Supreme Court) “be able 
to reconcile diversity with unity”.3 In the Quebec Secession Reference, 
the Court explained that the principle of federalism underlying the 
provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867 had “triumphed early”, ensuring 
a practice of federalism that, principally through a balanced 
interpretation of the federal-provincial distribution of legislative powers, 
                                                                                                                       
2 Sections 12, 41, 61, 65, 88, 102, 107, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 119, 121, 123, 124, 129, 
130, 139, 140. 
3 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 43 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Quebec Secession Reference”]. For useful commentary, see notably Jean-
François Gaudreault-DesBiens, “The ‘Principle of Federalism’ and the Legacy of the Patriation and 
Quebec Veto References” (2011) 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 77. For a comparative view, see W.J. Newman, 
“Adjudicating Divisions of Powers Issues: A Comparative Perspective” (2003) 21 S.C.L.R. (2d) 139.  
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maintained the diversity of the new country and the autonomy of the 
provinces within it.4 At the same time, the Constitution Act, 1867 was 
“an act of nation-building”; the “first step in the transition from colonies 
separately dependent on the Imperial Parliament for their governance to a 
unified and independent political state in which different peoples could 
resolve their disagreements and work together toward common goals and 
a common interest”. Federalism, the Court emphasized again, “was the 
political mechanism by which diversity could be reconciled with unity”.5  
III. THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE AND FEDERALISM 
The federal principle — as earlier judgments of the Supreme Court 
termed it, perhaps more appositely — is integrated into the very structure 
of the Constitution, and is reflected, in legal terms, in the division of 
powers, but also in central institutions (including the Senate and the 
Supreme Court) that are constitutionally entrenched and protected. It is 
also a principle that has, in political terms, provided the underlying 
reason for some important constitutional practices and conventions. 
It will be noted that in the Quebec Secession Reference, the Court spoke 
at length of the principle of federalism, but not of cooperative federalism per 
se. Indeed, in the Employment Insurance Act Reference, Deschamps J., 
writing for the Court, carefully stated an important proviso: 
… To derive the evolution of constitutional powers from the structure 
of Canada is delicate, as what that structure is will often depend on a 
given court’s view of what federalism is. What are regarded as the 
characteristic features of federalism may vary from one judge to 
another, and will be based on political rather than legal notions. The 
task of maintaining the balance between federal and provincial powers 
falls primarily to governments. If an issue comes before a court, the 
court must refer to the framers’ description of the power in order to 
identify its essential components, and must be guided by the way in 
which courts have interpreted the power in the past. In this area, the 
meaning of the words used may be adapted to modern-day realities, in a 
manner consistent with the separation of powers of the executive, 
legislative and judicial branches.6 
                                                                                                                       
4 Id., at paras. 55, 58. 
5 Id., at para. 43. 
6 Reference re Employment Insurance Act (Can.), ss. 22 and 23, [2005] S.C.J. No. 57, 
2005 SCC 56, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 669, at para. 10 (S.C.C.), revg [2004] J.Q. no 277 (Que. C.A.) 
(emphasis added). 
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That observation is, to my way of thinking, very apt. Indeed, the 
almost imperceptible shift in the jurisprudence from the recognition that, 
structurally, the Constitution embodies a federal principle, to the 
recognition of the principle of federalism, imported with it the potential 
for conflating the structural or foundational principle with the more 
abstract philosophical idea — and political ideology — of federalism 
itself.7 That is not inherently a bad thing, as long as lawyers and judges 
are conscious of the limits of political philosophy in illuminating the 
meaning of the legal provisions of the Constitution, and the limits of 
their expertise as political philosophers. 
IV. MANIFESTATIONS AND MODES OF FEDERALISM 
An illustration may prove useful at this point. In 1965, in a seminal 
piece, the late, great political scientist James R. Mallory wrote that: 
Canadian federalism is different things at different times. It is also different 
things to different people. This is not the result of widespread error but of 
simple fact, for political institutions which accommodate diversity will 
reflect the dimensions which are vital to the actors who work them.8 
Professor Mallory discerned five forms of Canadian federalism over 
the previous century: quasi-federalism (Professor K.C. Wheare’s 
description of the early period, characterized by central dominance), 
classical federalism (characterized by “the coordinate and autonomous 
relationship of the central and regional organs”, and corresponding, in 
the case law of the courts, to what was often called the period of legal 
federalism marked by adherence to the exclusivity of federal and 
provincial powers), emergency federalism (characterized by the extreme 
centralization of power during wartime), cooperative federalism (which 
“reached its zenith in the period since 1945”), and double-image 
federalism (Mallory’s term for the dimension of Canadian duality,  
                                                                                                                       
7 As Professor Ronald Watts observed, federalism “is not a descriptive but a normative 
term and refers to the advocacy of multi-tiered government combining elements of shared-rule and 
regional self-rule. The essence of federalism as a normative principle is the perpetuation of both 
union and non-centralization at the same time.” R.L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 2d ed. 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), at 6.  
8 J.R. Mallory, “The Five Faces of Federalism”, in P.-A. Crepeau & C.B. Macpherson, 
eds., The Future of Canadian Federalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), at 3. For a 
more recent, sensitive and book-length treatment of the measure, practice and habit of federalism 
(including a chapter on “parliamentary federalism”), vide David E. Smith, Federalism and the 
Constitution of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010). 
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“the special relationship between French and English” which overlay, 
and “to some extent transcends”, the central-regional relationship 
between central and provincial institutions).  
Other political scientists were to add to this typology and to speak of 
periods or modes of executive federalism, concurrent or competitive 
federalism, fiscal federalism and asymmetrical federalism. 
Cooperative federalism is predicated largely on a web of more or less 
informal, ongoing intergovernmental relationships and institutional 
arrangements that seek to adapt the formal structure of the Constitution to 
the economic and social needs and fiscal realities of a modern federal state. 
Taken in that light, it is perhaps less a principle than a practice, and more 
political than legal in its nature and substance, even if it had developed 
partly in reaction to the formal constraints of legal federalism that had been 
imposed by the jurisprudence of the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council prior to the Second World War. Professor Peter Russell called 
post-war cooperative federalism “less a litigious struggle between Ottawa 
and the provinces to defend and expand their own enclaves of power than 
a matter of political compromise and administrative pragmatism.”9 
Political scientist Donald Smiley stated that “[c]operative federalism is  
in essence a series of pragmatic and piecemeal responses by the  
federal and provincial governments to the circumstances of their mutual 
interdependence.”10 As Professor Peter Hogg described it, the “related 
demands of interdependence of governmental policies, equalization of 
regional disparities, and constitutional adaptation” have produced “a 
network of relationships between the executives of the central and regional 
governments”, through which “mechanisms are developed, especially 
fiscal mechanisms, which allow a continuous redistribution of powers and 
resources without recourse to the courts or the amending process”. These 
relationships have also been “the means by which consultations occur on 
the many issues of interest to both federal and provincial governments”.11 
Cooperative federalism, as a phenomenon, has been subject to 
varying assessments over the years. Those who have tended to look upon 
it with favour have pointed to its inherent flexibility and adaptability. 
                                                                                                                       
9 P.H. Russell, cited in David A.M. Seccareccia, “The Applicability of Co-Operative 
Federalism: Lessons Learned from the Assisted Human Reproduction Act” (2013) Electronic Thesis 
and Dissertation Repository, Paper 1582, at 18 [hereinafter “Seccareccia”].  
10 D.V. Smiley, “Co-operative Federalism: An Evaluation”, in J. Peter Meekison, ed., Canadian 
Federalism: Myth or Reality, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Methuen, 1971) 320, at 320 [hereinafter “Meekison”].  
11 P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. Supplemented (Toronto: Thomson 
Carswell, 2007), c. 5.8 (“Cooperative federalism”). 
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Those who have seen its effects as potentially insidious or pernicious12 
have claimed (depending on their perspective) that it threatens to 
centralize,13 or conversely, to decentralize,14 powers well beyond what 
the formal structure of the Constitution contemplates.  
V. JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION 
The courts have not been impermeable to this kind of political 
analysis and discourse, but in moving with the times, they were still 
usually careful to distinguish between what was text and what was 
context, and what might be considered a legal principle as opposed to a 
political practice or a convention binding political actors. Thus, in the 
Anti-Inflation Act Reference, Laskin C.J.C., writing for a majority of the 
Supreme Court, dismissed an argument advanced by an intervener that 
cooperative federalism constituted a limit upon Parliament’s legislative 
authority: 
One of the submissions made by counsel for Secondary School 
Teachers’ organizations concerned provincial co-operation, but it was 
put in terms of an objection to the validity of the federal legislation, the 
proposition being that inflation was too sweeping a subject to be dealt 
with by a single authority, i.e., the federal Parliament, and that the 
proper constitutional approach, at least as a first approach, was through 
federal-provincial co-operation in terms of their respective powers 
under the respective enumerations in ss. 91 and 92. If this is meant to 
suggest that Parliament cannot act in relation to inflation even in a 
crisis situation, I must disagree. No doubt, federal-provincial co-
operation along the lines suggested might have been attempted, but it 
does not follow that the federal policy that was adopted is vulnerable 
because a co-operative scheme on a legislative power basis was not 
                                                                                                                       
12 For a searching critique of cooperative federalism (and its arguable potential for stifling, 
through collusion and opaque practices, the competition naturally inherent in a federation) from the 
perspective of a Canadian economist, see Albert Breton, “Towards a Theory of Competitive 
Federalism” (1987) 3 European Journal of Political Economy 263. For an able summary of and 
critical observations on Professor Breton’s views, see Seccareccia, supra, note 9, at 29-38.  
13 For an illustration, see Jean-Marc Léger, “Cooperative Federalism or the New Face of 
Centralization”, in Meekison, supra, note 10, at 317. 
14 Smiley, supra, note 10, at 332: “The first kind of danger to the Canadian federal system 
in cooperative federalism is that provincial pressures for autonomy will so weaken the federal 
government that it will be unable to discharge its responsibilities for the integration and development 
of the Canadian economy, for economic stabilization and growth and for interregional and 
interpersonal equalization. There are strong forces towards the enhanced power of the provinces.”  
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tried first. Co-operative federalism may be consequential upon a lack of 
federal legislative power, but it is not a ground for denying it.15 
In the Patriation Reference, while a majority of the Court opined that 
the process undertaken by the federal government was constitutionally 
lawful, a second majority of the same Court recognized the existence of a 
constitutional convention requiring a substantial degree of provincial 
consent before constitutional amendments affecting provincial powers 
could be put forward, by way of resolutions of the federal houses of 
Parliament, for enactment by the United Kingdom Parliament. “The 
reason for the rule”, the Court stated in its majority reasons, “is the 
federal principle.” 
… Canada is a federal union. 
..... 
The federal principle cannot be reconciled with a state of affairs where 
the modification of provincial legislative powers could be obtained by 
the unilateral action of the federal authorities.16  
In the Quebec Veto Reference, a unanimous Supreme Court, while 
perhaps prepared to recognize the existence of a principle of Canadian 
duality (which, it was urged by the Attorney General for Quebec, should 
here be taken in the special sense of Quebec’s distinctiveness as a 
society), could not conclude that the principle had, in and of itself, given 
rise to a binding convention. 
We have been referred to an abundance of material, speeches made in 
the course of parliamentary debates, reports of royal commissions, 
opinions of historians, political scientists, constitutional experts which 
endorse in one way or another the principle of duality within the 
meaning assigned to it by the appellant, and there can be no doubt that 
many Canadian statesmen, politicians and experts favoured this 
principle.17 
However, the Court held that it was not necessary to look further into 
the matter because the appellant had failed “to demonstrate compliance 
                                                                                                                       
15 Re: Anti-Inflation Act (Canada), [1976] S.C.J. No. 12, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, at 421 
(S.C.C.) (emphasis added). 
16 Re: Resolution to amend the Constitution of Canada, [1981] S.C.J. No. 58, [1981] 1 
S.C.R. 753, at 905 (S.C.C.), varg [1981] M.J. No. 95 (Man. C.A.). 
17 Re: Objection by Quebec to a Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1982] S.C.J.  
No. 101, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793, at 814 (S.C.C.), affg [1982] C.A. 33 (Que. C.A.). 
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with the most important requirement for establishing a convention, that 
is, acceptance or recognition by the actors in the precedents.” 
In the OPSEU case, Beetz J. held that an enactment by a provincial 
legislature that bears on the operation of an institution of the provincial 
government can be considered to be an amendment to the constitution of 
the province, provided, inter alia, that “it is not otherwise entrenched as 
being indivisibly related to the federal principle or to a fundamental term 
or condition of the union”.18  
Chief Justice Dickson, in his concurring opinion in OPSEU, 
underscored the movement, in the recent cases of the Court, towards 
allowing for “a fair amount of interplay and indeed overlap between 
federal and provincial powers”,19 favouring the doctrines of pith-and-
substance and double-aspect over the “watertight compartments” 
approach20 that was still reflected, to some extent, in doctrines such as 
interjurisdictional immunity. 
In 1990, Sopinka J., writing for a unanimous Supreme Court in the 
Canada Assistance Plan Reference,21 rejected an argument advanced by 
the Attorney General of Manitoba that a unilateral, legislative 
termination of a federal-provincial agreement under which a province 
had acquired vested rights to monetary contributions would be ultra vires 
Parliament, or alternatively, even if it were within Parliament’s 
legislative authority under the division of powers, it would be 
unconstitutional in light of the “overriding principle of federalism”.22 
Justice Sopinka, who throughout his opinion had underlined that the 
“applicable constitutional principle” in this reference was parliamentary 
sovereignty,23 denied a role to the courts in supervising the exercise of 
the federal spending power. “If a statute is neither ultra vires nor contrary 
to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the courts have no 
jurisdiction to supervise the exercise of legislative power.”24 
                                                                                                                       
18 Ontario Public Service Employees' Union v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1987] S.C.J. 
No. 48, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2, at 40 (S.C.C.), affg [1980] O.J. No. 3863 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter 
“OPSEU”]. 
19 Id., at 18. 
20 For a consideration of this and other constitutional metaphors, see W.J. Newman, “Of 
Castles and Living Trees: The Metaphorical and Structural Constitution” (2015) 9 Journal of 
Parliamentary and Political Law 471. 
21 Reference re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 60, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525 
(S.C.C.), revg [1990] B.C.J. No. 1377 (B.C.C.A.). 
22 Id., at 565. 
23 Id. 
24 Id., at 567 (emphasis added). 
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By 2005, in the Pelland case, Abella J. upheld the validity of a federal-
provincial arrangement for the marketing of chicken production, an 
arrangement which, she noted, “both reflects and reifies Canadian 
federalism’s constitutional creativity and cooperative flexibility”.25 
Moreover, the administrative delegation “in aid of cooperative federalism” 
was upheld therein in accordance with a long line of judicial precedent.26 
Two years later, in Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, which quickly 
became the leading case (and a valiant effort to articulate a unified field 
theory of federalism and its attendant constitutional doctrines), Binnie 
and LeBel JJ. recognized that “while the task of maintaining the balance 
of powers in practice falls primarily to governments, constitutional 
doctrine must facilitate, not undermine what this Court has called ‘co-
operative federalism’”.27 In this case, that meant restricting the ambit of 
the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, a broad application of which 
would be “inconsistent’, the Court held, “with the flexible federalism that 
the constitutional doctrines of pith and substance, double aspect and 
federal paramountcy are designed to promote”.28 Moreover, Binnie and 
LeBel JJ. made the leap beyond the legal text of the Constitution to the 
larger political context in which federalism operates: 
 … Canadian federalism is not simply a matter of legalisms. The 
Constitution, though a legal document, serves as a framework for life 
and for political action within a federal state, in which the courts have 
rightly observed the importance of co-operation among government 
actors to ensure that federalism operates flexibly.29 
This emphasis on the importance of cooperation, in a federal state, 
amongst political actors was not, of course, an injunction, and construed 
in the context of the case, simply meant that courts should be 
encouraging rather than hindering cooperation in their application of 
constitutional doctrines of interpretation to the resolution of the legal 
issues before them. Nevertheless, it would not be long before divergent 
perspectives on the Court would emerge as to just what facilitating 
cooperative federalism might require. 
                                                                                                                       
25 Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Pelland, [2005] S.C.J. No. 19, 
2005 SCC 20, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 292, at para. 15 (S.C.C.), affg [2003] J.Q. no 3331 (Que. C.A.) 
[hereinafter “Pelland”].  
26 Id., at para. 55. 
27 Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, 2007 SCC 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, 
at para. 24 (S.C.C.), affg [2005] A.J. No. 21 (Alta. C.A.). 
28 Id., at para. 42. 
29 Id. 
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Thus it was that in Lacombe,30 Canadian Owners and Pilots 
Association,31 and the Assisted Human Reproduction Act Reference,32 
Deschamps and LeBel JJ. parted company with McLachlin C.J.C. (joined 
by Binnie J., amongst others) in their analysis of the demands of 
federalism — and more particularly, cooperative federalism — in these 
cases. In her dissenting reasons in Lacombe, Deschamps J. invoked not 
only “the unwritten constitutional principle of federalism”, but also what 
she called “its underlying principles of co-operative federalism and 
subsidiarity”,33 to restrict the scope and application of interjurisdictional 
immunity and paramountcy.34 In the Assisted Human Reproduction Act 
Reference, the diverging views related to the scope of the criminal law 
power in the area of health and, inter alia, the ancillary powers doctrine 
in federalism analysis. Thus, in the opinion of the Chief Justice, the 
rational, functional connection test employed in relation to ancillary 
provisions recognizes that the federal and provincial heads of power “are 
no longer watertight”. 
… The complexity of modern legislation will often render it impossible 
for one level of government to fulfil its constitutional mandate without 
trespassing on the jurisdiction of the other level. The Court’s 
endorsement of a flexible, cooperative approach to federalism suggests 
that this kind of pragmatic lawmaking should be encouraged … .35 
Justices LeBel and Deschamps countered that in their view the attempt 
to extend the reach of the legislation under the criminal law power was 
“specious” and “unacceptable under the constitutional principles which 
                                                                                                                       
30 Quebec (Attorney General) v. Lacombe, [2010] S.C.J. No. 38, 2010 SCC 38, [2010] 2 
S.C.R. 453 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lacombe”].  
31 Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canadian Owners and Pilots Association, [2010] S.C.J. 
No. 39, 2010 SCC 39, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 536 (S.C.C.). 
32 Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, [2010] S.C.J. No. 61, 2010 SCC 61, 
[2010] 3 S.C.R. 457 (S.C.C.), varg [2008] J.Q. no 5489 (Que. C.A.). 
33 Lacombe, supra, note 30, at para. 119. 
34 Id., at para. 116, for example: “with all due respect for the Chief Justice, despite the fact that 
she refers expressly to co-operative federalism, her approach to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity 
is antithetical to co-operation between the levels of government and the views expressed by Binnie and 
LeBel JJ., writing for the majority, in Canadian Western Bank”. See also para. 107.  
35 Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, supra, note 32, at para. 139. For example, 
s. 68 of the impugned legislation (authorizing the Governor in Council to declare provisions of the 
statute inapplicable in a province where a provincial law contains similar provisions, pursuant to an 
agreement with the province) “provides a flexible approach to federal-provincial cooperation, which is 
appropriate to modern federalism, where matters frequently attract concurrent legislative authority” 
(para. 152). Justices LeBel and Deschamps replied that s. 68 had given the federal government “a legal 
tool to impose its own standards” and that provincial regulatory action would only be “tolerated” where 
“the provinces in question adhere to the federal scheme” (para. 272).  
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ground federalism”, including the principle of subsidiarity, and the 
connection between the criminal law provisions and the ancillary 
provisions was “artificial”.36  
In canvassing the principle of federalism in the Securities Act 
Reference, a unanimous Court noted that while the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council had “tended to favour an exclusive powers approach”, 
the Supreme Court itself had “moved towards a more flexible view of 
federalism that accommodates overlapping jurisdiction and encourages 
intergovernmental cooperation”, citing the decisions in Pelland, OPSEU 
and Canadian Western Bank as examples of the Court’s having “rejected 
rigid formalism in favour of accommodating cooperative governmental 
efforts”.37 Having said all that, the Court then pulled back significantly: 
While flexibility and cooperation are important to federalism, they 
cannot override or modify the separation [sic; division] of powers. The 
Secession Reference affirmed federalism as an underlying 
constitutional principle that demands respect for the constitutional 
division of powers and the maintenance of a constitutional balance 
between federal and provincial powers. 
In summary, notwithstanding the Court’s promotion of cooperative and 
flexible federalism, the constitutional boundaries that underlie the 
division of powers must be respected. The “dominant tide” of flexible 
federalism, however strong its pull may be, cannot sweep designated 
powers out to sea, nor erode the constitutional balance inherent in the 
Canadian federal state.38  
The Court went on to find the Canada’s proposed Securities Act to be 
ultra vires Parliament’s trade and commerce power, but returned, almost 
lyrically, to the virtues of “a cooperative approach” that would recognize 
the “essentially provincial nature of securities regulation while allowing 
Parliament to deal with genuinely national concerns”: 
It is not for the Court to suggest to the governments of Canada and the 
provinces the way forward by, in effect, conferring in advance  
an opinion on the constitutionality on this or that alternative scheme. 
Yet we may appropriately note the growing practice of resolving  
the complex governance problems that arise in federations, not by the 
bare logic of either/or, but by seeking cooperative solutions that meet 
the needs of the country as a whole as well as its constituent parts. 
                                                                                                                       
36 Id., at paras. 271, 273 and 278. 
37 Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, 2011 SCC 66, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837,  
at paras. 56-58 (S.C.C.). 
38 Id., at paras. 61-62 (emphasis added). 
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Such an approach is supported by the Canadian constitutional 
principles and by the practice adopted by the federal and provincial 
governments in other fields of activities. The backbone of these 
schemes is the respect that each level of government has for each 
other’s own sphere of jurisdiction. Cooperation is the animating force. 
The federalism principle upon which Canada’s constitutional 
framework rests demands nothing less.39 
One cannot fail to be impressed by the Court’s leadership, in cases 
such as Pelland, Canadian Western Bank and the Securities Act 
Reference, in accommodating, encouraging and promoting cooperative 
federalism, not only as a discipline for itself, but also as a practice to 
which enlightened federal and provincial governmental actors would be 
wise to adhere. The fact that governments of various political stripes and 
perspectives do not always see eye to eye on policy priorities and do not 
always arrive at agreement or harmony in coordinating legislative 
initiatives is no reason not to continue to signal the advantages of 
cohesion. Many of the important lessons in life are best learned through 
repetition, tedious though it might seem. 
The difficulty arises when strong adherents of cooperative federalism 
are confronted with what, to them, is clear evidence of an obstinate 
failure to embrace the wisdom behind the lesson. This can lead, once 
again, to starkly divergent views as to what federalism and other 
constitutional principles permit or require, not only amongst the relevant 
political actors, but amongst proponents on the bench. 
In Attorney General of Quebec v. Attorney General of Canada,40 a 
majority of the Supreme Court upheld Parliament’s legislative authority 
to require the destruction of all records contained in the registries related 
to the registration of long guns, consequent upon Parliament’s repeal, 
through the enactment of the Ending the Long-gun Registry Act, of the 
registration requirement and the decriminalization of the possession of  
an unregistered long gun. The Superior Court of Quebec had declared the 
impugned provision (section 29 of the Act) unconstitutional, and the 
Quebec Court of Appeal had reversed that decision. 
Justices LeBel, Wagner and Gascon, supported by Justice Abella, 
wrote dissenting reasons. In their view, the trial judge had been correct in 
                                                                                                                       
39 Id., at paras. 132-133 (emphasis added). 
40 Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 14, 2015 
SCC 14, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 693 (S.C.C.), affg [2013] J.Q. no 6676 (Que. C.A.). For a detailed and 
thoughtful critique, see Johanne Poirier, “Souveraineté parlementaire et armes à feu: le fédéralisme 
coopératif dans la ligne de mire? ” (2015) 45 R.D.U.S. 47. 
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finding that a federal-provincial partnership had developed with respect 
to firearms control. This partnership, they wrote, was “consistent with the 
spirit of cooperative federalism”.41 The “modern view” of federalism had 
replaced the “classical approach” with “a more flexible conception” of 
the division of powers.42 Cooperative federalism had been developed to 
“adapt the principle of federalism to this modern reality”:43 
Co-operative federalism reflects the realities of an increasingly complex 
society that requires the enactment of co-ordinated federal and provincial 
legislative schemes to better deal with the local needs of unity and 
diversity … . From a legal perspective, it is by allowing for overlapping 
powers through the application of the pith and substance and ancillary 
powers doctrines that co-operative federalism is able to meet those needs 
and, in this sense, to enable the goals of federalism to be realized. 
..... 
In the novel circumstances of this case, our analysis must be guided by 
the Constitution’s unwritten principles. In particular, we must be 
careful not to place the principle of federalism and its modern form — 
co-operative federalism — in jeopardy.44 
Justices Cromwell and Karakatsanis, writing for the majority of the 
Court, dismissed the appeal to cooperative federalism, as advanced by 
the Attorney General of Quebec.  
Quebec invokes the principle of cooperative federalism in support of 
both its argument that s. 29 of the ELRA is ultra vires and its claim that 
Quebec has the right to receive the data contained in the CFR related to 
long guns connected to Quebec. In essence, Quebec is asking us to 
recognize that the principle of cooperative federalism prevents Canada 
and the provinces from acting or legislating in a way that would hinder 
cooperation between both orders of government, especially in spheres 
of concurrent jurisdiction. 
In our respectful view, Quebec’s position has no foundation in our 
constitutional law and is contrary to the governing authorities from  
this Court.45 
The reasons of the majority characterize cooperative federalism  
as a “descriptive concept” from which the courts have developed a  
                                                                                                                       
41 Id., at para. 149.  
42 Id., at para. 147. 
43 Id. 
44 Id., at paras. 148, 151 (emphasis added). 
45 Id., at paras. 15-16. 
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“legal principle” that has been employed “to provide flexibility” in the 
application of division-of-powers doctrines such as interjurisdictional 
immunity and paramountcy, facilitate the enactment of interlocking 
federal and provincial legislative measures and to avoid unnecessarily 
constraining legislative action by each order of government.46 However, 
“the limits of cooperative federalism” include the primacy of the text of 
the Constitution. “The principle of cooperative federalism”, wrote 
Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ., “cannot be seen as imposing limits on 
the otherwise valid exercise of legislative competence”:47 
In our respectful view, the principle of cooperative federalism does not 
assist Quebec in this case. Neither this Court’s jurisprudence nor the text 
of the Constitution Act, 1867 supports using that principle to limit the 
scope of legislative authority or to impose a positive obligation to 
facilitate cooperation where the constitutional division of powers 
authorizes unilateral action. To hold otherwise would undermine 
parliamentary sovereignty and create legal uncertainty whenever one 
order of government adopted legislation having some impact on the 
policy objectives of another. Paradoxically, such an approach could 
discourage the practice of cooperative federalism for fear that 
cooperative measures could risk diminishing a government’s legislative 
authority to act alone. 
We conclude that the principle of cooperative federalism does not 
prevent Parliament from exercising legislative authority that it 
otherwise possesses to dispose of the data.48 
Justices Wagner and Côté recently reiterated this view on behalf of 
eight of the nine judges of the Court in Rogers Communications v. 
Châteauguay,49 stating: 
… [A]lthough co-operative federalism has become a principle that the 
courts have invoked to provide flexibility for the interpretation and 
application of the constitutional doctrines relating to the division of 
powers, such as federal paramountcy and interjurisdictional immunity, 
it can neither override nor modify the division of powers itself.  
                                                                                                                       
46 Id., at para. 17. (See also Saskatchewan (Attorney General) v. Lemare Lake Logging Ltd., 
[2015] S.C.J. No. 53, 2015 SCC 15, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 419 (S.C.C.), varg [2014] S.J. No. 164 (Sask. 
C.A.), per Abella and Gascon JJ. for the majority (at para. 21): “Given the guiding principle of 
cooperative federalism, paramountcy must be narrowly construed.”) 
47 Id., at paras. 18-19. 
48 Id., at paras. 20-21 (emphasis added). 
49 Rogers Communications Inc. v. Châteauguay (City), [2016] S.C.J. No. 23, 2016 SCC 23 
(S.C.C.), per Wagner and Côté JJ. in joint reasons (McLachlin C.J.C. and Abella, Cromwell, 
Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Brown JJ., concurring).  
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It cannot be seen as imposing limits on the valid exercise of legislative 
authority: Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), at 
paras. 17-19. Nor can it support a finding that an otherwise 
unconstitutional law is valid.50 
VI. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM: A MEANS OF IMPLEMENTING 
THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE 
That position strikes me as fundamentally sound. The “principle of 
cooperative federalism” — if it is a legal or constitutional principle — 
must be balanced against other constitutional principles, including the 
well-established principle of parliamentary sovereignty and the emerging 
principle of the separation of powers (whereby the judicial branch, like 
the executive and legislative branches, must not overstep its bounds), and 
must not supplant the supremacy of the Constitution’s provisions, 
particularly the division of legislative powers established in sections 91 
and 92 et seq. of the Constitution Act, 1867. 
The jurisprudence has evolved to a point where even the majority 
position is that cooperative federalism began as a “descriptive concept” 
— that is, the essentially political understanding of cooperative 
federalism as a series of flexible, informal, pragmatic institutional and 
administrative arrangements — that has given rise to a legal principle 
itself commanding, or at least encouraging, flexibility in the application 
of the doctrines employed by the courts in construing the constitutional 
distribution of powers. While a remarkable development, this is not 
particularly troubling insofar as it has acted largely to date as a form of 
self-imposed judicial restraint on the impulse to improve upon our 
Constitution’s division of legislative jurisdiction and powers through 
creative interpretation. The challenge is to avoid taking the further, facile 
steps of abandoning the discipline of empirical analysis and conflating an 
interpretive rule or legal technique with an idealized constitutional 
principle of cooperative federalism, and then applying that broad 
principle normatively, without much discernment, to practical situations 
and dynamics perhaps better classified as something other than 
cooperative in character, and thereby altering the original form and 
                                                                                                                       
50 Id., at para. 39. Justice Gascon, in separate reasons, contended for a “flexible approach tailored 
to the modern conception of federalism, which allows for some overlapping and favours a spirit of  
co-operation” (at para. 93); Wagner and Côté JJ. agreed with a generous and flexible approach, but added 
(at para. 47): “However, flexibility has its limits, and this approach cannot be used to distort a measure’s 
pith and substance at the risk of restricting significantly an exclusive power granted to Parliament.” 
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function of the “principle” (as well as, perhaps, the constitutional division of 
powers itself).  
In my respectful view, however, such problems can be avoided if 
cooperative federalism is better understood as a modality than a 
principle. Cooperative federalism, like executive federalism, concurrent 
federalism, and the many other descriptive and normative classifications 
that characterize the dynamics, at any given time, of the myriad 
interactions amongst political actors in a modern federal state like 
Canada, is a means of implementing the federal principle that is at the 
heart of the constitutional framework. With a principle comes structure 
and normativity. With a modality comes fluidity and flexibility — the 
very elements cooperative federalism was meant to convey. 
By a modality, I do not wish to introduce yet another abstruse concept 
into the rarefied field of constitutional hermeneutics — a field 
increasingly plagued, from the point of view of the practitioner, by 
inaccessible and intangible notions. To the contrary, the idea of 
cooperative federalism as a modality is simply to see the cooperative 
mode as one manner, way or means — perhaps a privileged means, but 
still only one amongst others — of implementing (or in the language of 
the dictionary, of doing, expressing or experiencing) federalism and the 
federal principle.  
I realize that beyond the structure and provisions of the Constitution 
Act, 1867 on the division of legislative powers, arguments may be made 
that other parts of the Constitution of Canada favour the 
conceptualization of cooperative federalism as an underlying structural 
principle. Part III of the Constitution Act, 1982,51 for example, records a 
commitment on the part of Parliament and the provincial legislatures and 
the federal and provincial governments to promote equal opportunities 
for the well-being of Canadians, furthering economic development to 
reduce disparity, and providing essential public services of reasonable 
quality to all Canadians. This undertaking is coupled with a commitment 
on the part of Parliament and the government of Canada “to the principle 
of making equalization payments” to ensure that provincial governments 
have enough revenue to provide “reasonably comparable levels of public 
services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation”.52 Cooperative 
federalism, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, was very much associated 
with the need for federal-provincial coordination, arrangements and 
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mechanisms to deal with fiscal imbalances, regional disparities, 
equalization payments and the social safety net. However, it should be 
noted that Part III also carefully preserves, in express terms, the 
legislative authority of Parliament and the provincial legislatures.  
With respect to Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, Professor Kate 
Glover has written that the multilateral procedures for constitutional 
amendment substantiate the claim that cooperative federalism is more 
than simply a modern mode of federalism but is “embedded within the 
constitutional architecture”.53 In my view, Part V is at best agnostic as to 
the virtues of cooperative federalism. It is true that the multilateral 
procedures necessitate, as a matter of fact, some degree of coordination 
— and thus arguably cooperation — if they are to operate effectively to 
achieve constitutional change. However, the amending procedures, to the 
extent that they serve the dual purpose54 of not only effecting 
constitutional change where the requisite federal and provincial 
authorizing resolutions have been obtained, but also protecting key 
institutions and provisions against constitutional change where no such 
consensus exists, might be said to rely as much on the possibility of the 
non-cooperation of federal and provincial legislative bodies as on their 
actual cooperation. In other words, in terms of political dynamics, the 
Part V multilateral procedures may reward the recalcitrance of political 
actors who do not want to achieve constitutional change, as much as they 
reward the cooperation of those who do want constitutional change.  
None of this is to gainsay the strong desirability of federal-provincial-
territorial cooperation in the modern Canadian state, or to ignore the 
fundamental character of the federal principle in animating the provisions 
of the Constitution of Canada. Rather, it is to suggest that the expertise of 
courts may not lie with the elucidation of cooperative federalism as a 
constitutional norm and the evaluation, from a legal vantage point, of  
its good-faith implementation against some theoretical standard or 
idealized criterion. 
                                                                                                                       
53 K. Glover, “Structural Cooperative Federalism” (a paper presented at the Osgoode 
Constitutional Cases Conference on April 8, 2016). See also, however, Carissima Mathen, “The 
Federal Principle: Constitutional Amendment and Intergovernmental Relations”, in Emmett 
Macfarlane, ed., Constitutional Amendment in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 
c. 3. Professor Mathen writes, inter alia (at 75), that “The dominant judicial approach to Part V runs 
the risk of reifying the federal principle at the expense of other values.”  
54 I have discussed this dual purpose in previous writings: vide W.J. Newman, “Living with 
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In many cases, the indicia of federal-provincial cooperation will be 
self-evident, as when federal and provincial Attorneys General band 
together to defend the constitutionality of some federal or provincial 
legislative measure,55 or an interlocking federal and provincial legislative 
and regulatory scheme, that has been attacked by some other party.56 In 
other cases, the concept of cooperation itself may give rise to differing 
perspectives amongst the governmental actors before the courts.  
Who must cooperate with whom for a constitutional norm or principle 
of cooperative federalism to be respected? Is there cooperation when 
some or perhaps most provinces fail to support a federal government 
initiative? Is there cooperation when the federal government demurs, for 
its own reasons, from advancing a measure initiated or supported by 
certain or perhaps most provinces? Cooperation is often in the eye of the 
beholder, and the perception of effective cooperation, or the lack of it, 
may depend on whose interests are at play, and whether one’s own 
project or initiative is at stake or whether one is on the receiving end of 
importuning attentions aimed at achieving buy-in and consensus. 
In the Quebec Secession Reference, the Supreme Court recognized 
that in the context of constitutional negotiations — even those governed 
by constitutional principles including federalism, democracy, 
constitutionalism and the protection of minorities — “the distinction 
between the strong defence of legitimate interests” by political actors and 
“the taking of positions which, in fact, ignore the legitimate interests of 
others” is one that “defies legal analysis”. The “reconciliation of 
legitimate constitutional interests” in such negotiations, the Court 
observed, is “necessarily committed to the political rather than the 
judicial realm” and the give-and-take of the negotiation process.57  
Insofar as cooperative federalism as a concept is similarly predicated 
upon consultations, discussions and negotiations amongst political actors 
with a view to facilitating federal-provincial-territorial arrangements or 
developing complementary legislative measures, the courts should be 
slow to intervene on the basis of a claim that the principle of cooperative 
federalism has not been fully met or respected in course of that process 
or in some legislative outcome. The courts must continue to ask 
themselves whether there is a justiciable claim based upon the ambit of 
the provisions of the Constitution (most often in the area of the division 
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of powers), or whether, having regard to their expertise — the 
interpretation of law — an argument based on a constructive breach of a 
putative constitutional norm or principle of cooperative federalism would 
invite them into a realm best left to the dynamics of the political process. 
To borrow another analogy from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
— this time in the field of administrative law — the fluidity of the 
political dynamics and the simultaneous advocacy, defence and balancing 
of legitimate interests amongst numerous federal and provincial political 
actors in the pursuit of cooperative federalism involves a polycentric 
evaluation that may be better performed by political scientists (and even 
pundits) than legal experts. As Bastarache J. stated in Pushpanathan, 
“[w]hile judicial procedure is premised on a bipolar opposition of parties, 
interests, and factual discovery, some problems require the consideration 
of numerous interests simultaneously, and the promulgation of solutions 
which concurrently balance benefits and costs for many different 
parties. Where an administrative structure more closely resembles this 
model, courts will exercise restraint.”58  
Conceptualizing cooperative federalism as a modality for implementing 
the federal principle is one way of recognizing the limits of the courts’ 
role in advancing this concept, and one that is more consonant with the 
Supreme Court’s appreciation of its proper place in Canada’s constitutional 
and democratic institutional framework. As long as cooperative federalism 
is not transformed into an obligation of result by the magical properties of 
constitutional principles, it should remain a useful means of approaching 
many of the challenges of the modern federal state. 
                                                                                                                       
58 Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] S.C.J. No. 
46, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, at para. 36 (S.C.C.), revg [1995] F.C.J. No. 1716 (F.C.A.). 
 
